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BRIEF OF DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF CASE
This involves the question if Salt Lake City can collect
a revenue tax from attorneys practicing law alone when the City
charges
a firm.

them a higher tax than attorneys officing together or in
Defendant contends that the tax is invalid and not uniform

and in violation of the Utah Statute and the State and Federal
Constitutions.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
In the lower Court, the plaintiff made a Motion for Summary
Judgment and the defendant made a Motion for Summary Judgment and
the Court granted plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant asks for reversal of the Judgment entered by the
Lower Court and asks the Supreme Court to hold that the City
Ordinance and the manner of enforcement if invalid.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The defendant refused to pay the tax upon the grounds that it
discriminated against him and all lawyers practicing alone. That
a lawyer practicing alone pays a tax of $30.00.

That the largest

firm in Utah pays a tax of $3.88 per lawyer. See Affidavit
of Defendant (R. 30-33) # and Third Amended Answer to Defendant's
Interrogatories (R. 10 8) and the list and amounts paid by attorneys
(R. 110-120), and Exhibit "A" entitled Alpha Listing City Business
License Renewals, which was made a part of the Second Amended Answer
to Defendant's Interrogatories (R. 157), which is a list of
businesses paying license fees which is about lJr inches thick
and is part of the record, but not part of the file.
That the defendant made a Motion for Summary Judgment and based
it upon the files and records and upon the Affidavit of Defendant
(S. 28-38).
That the Legislature in 1935 enacted a statute which was
Chapter 24, which was brought forward into 1943 at 15-8-80 and
siibsequently brought forward in Utah Code Annotated, 1953, Replacement
Volume No. 2, Section 10-8-80, which statute is as follows:
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"They (cities) may raise revenue by levying and
collecting a license fee or tax on any business
within the limits of the city, and regulate the
same by ordinance; provided, that no Utah city
or town shall collect a license fee or tax hereunder from any solicitor of salesman who
solicits obtains orders for or sells goods in such
city or town solely for resale; and no enumeration
of powers of cities contained in this chapter
shall be deemed to limit or restrict the
general grant of authority hereby conferred.
All such license fees and taxes shall be uniform
in respect to class upon which they are imposed,"
That Salt Lake City, relying upon the above quoted section 108-80, passed Ordinance, Section 20-1-1 providing:
"Unlawful to transact business without a license
It shall be unlawful for any person to engage in
or carry on any business, trade or profession or
calling, within Salt Lake City for the transaction or carrying on of which a license is
required, without first taking out or procuring a
license required for such business, trade, profession or calling."
And Ordinance 20-3-1(2), Engaging in Business:
"Engaging in business" includes but is not limited
to the sale of tangible personal property at
retail or wholesale, the manufacturing of goods
or property and the rendering of personal
services for others for a consideration by persons
engaged in any profession, trade, craft, business
occupation or other calling, except the rendering
of personal services by an employee to his employer
under any contract of personal employment."
Sec. 20-3-2. License fee levied. (a) There is
hereby levied upon the business of every person
engaged in business inSalt Lake City at a place
of business within the city an annual license fee
of $30.00 per place of business, plus an additional
fee of $3.00 for each and every employee, exceeding
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one, engaged in the operation of said business,
based upon the number of employees."
And Ordinance 20-3-1 (4)# states:
"(4) Employee, "Employee means the operator,
owner or manager of said place of business and
any persons employed by such person in the
operation of said place of business in any
capacity and also any salesman, agent or
independent contractor engaged in the operation
of said place of business in any capacity."
'That Salt Lake City furnished to the defendant a list of all
people paying license fees, which is Exhibit A. which was made
a part of the Second Amended Answer to Defendant's Interrogatories.
(R. 157) f as Exhibit A, not in the file.

It is about 1-|- inches

thick and it is part of the Record on Appeal and is called Alpha
City Business License Renewals. That the defendant obtained a list
of all the attorneys practicing in Salt Lake County from the Utah
State Bar, See Exhibit "A" attached to defendant's Further Answers
to Plaintiff's Interrogatories, (R. 80-96) and made a calculation
from Exhibit "A" which shows there is approximately 388 attorneys
who have paid a license fee in Salt Lake City. Out of this number
of people, 116 lawyers are practicing alone and there are 69 firms.
(R. 82-96 and 134-135).
That there are three different classifications the City is
taxing. They are taxing professional law corporations and from
information furnished by the City, they charge $30.00 for one member
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of the professional corporation arid $3.00 for the other members of
the law finn.

In the case of Van Cott, Bagley, Cornwall & Mc Carthy#

according to a new announcement, they have 34 attorneys in the
firm.

Twenty-one are allegedly partners and 13 are paid attorney

employees or a total of 34 lawyers practicing law and who would
be paying a total fee of $132.00 or $3.88 per lawyer. Thirty-four
lawyers practicing alone would pay $1,020.00.
That in plaintiff's Third Amended Answer to defendant's Interrogatories (R. 110-120) on page 119, it shows the firm of Van Cott,
Bagley, Cornwall & Mc Carthy paid in 1973, $216.00. See Affidavit
of Defendant in Opposition to plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment.
That one lawyer in the firm pays $30.00 and the other lawyers
in the firm pay $3.00 : $3.00 x 33=$99.00 + $30.00, total $129.00.
The firm paid a tax of $216.00. There is a difference of $87.00
which would be for stenographers at $3.00 a piece, would mean that
there are 29 stenographers and 34 lawyers.
The second situation is where we have lawyers in the same
office merely sharing expenses that, they are by no means a firm and
they are not a partnership or a professional corporation, but they
merely share expenses. We contend that is discrimination because
they are all practicing separate and distinct.
Thus, by officing together attorneys pay a much reduced tax,
depending on the number of attorneys so officing.
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Even though such an

attorney may utilize just as much office sp-ice# if not more than
the attorney who practices alone.

For example, if ten (10)

attorneys office together and divide the tax, $30.00 plus $3.00 x 9=
27.00, the group will pay $57.00, which will make a total of $5.70
for each attorney as opposed to the $30.00 for the attorney who
practices alone. (R. 32)

If the ten attorneys are practicing alone or

if they practice across the hall from each other in spearate offices,
they will pay $300.00.
That according to the Bar list, there are 873 attorneys in
Salt Lake City and there are 129 attorneys who have paid a license
fee individually.

We found 354 lawyers in firms paid a license

fee and the balance did not pay license fees.
Section 10-8-80 above quoted says only business and plaintiff
must write into the act something which is not there that they are
entitled to tax lawyers and lawyers are covered by a special act:
Title 78, Chapter 51.
That all lawyers are required to pass an examination and have
a license to practice law under the Utah State Bar Act. This is
provided by Title 78, Chapter 51 and Section 1, 23, 24.
The Utah State Bar has furnished a list of lawyers who can
practice in Salt Lake County and there are 966 lawyers on that list
not including judges. We have calculated that there are about 93 in
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Salt Lake County outside of Salt Lake Cityf leaving a balance of
873 attorneys who can practice in Salt Lake City. See Further
Answer to Plaintiff's Interrogatories dated September 12 # 1973 (R. 80-97)
ARGUMENT
POINT I

'

TAX MUST BE UNIFORM ON THE SAME CLASS
Salt Lake City by its definition makes lawyers in a firm or
officing together and sharing expenses employees when the fact is
that they are not employees but are doing business as lawyers.
The statutef Section 10-8-80 says:
"***A11 such license fees and taxes shall be
uniform in respect to class upon which they
are imposed."
The class is lawyers and everyone in the law profession must
be treated substantially equal which is not true if one lawyer
pays $30.00 and another pays $3.00.
together, they would each pay $15.00.

If two lawyers are practicing
If the same two lawyers were

practicing across the hall from each other, they would each pay $30.00
or a total of $60.00.
It is our contention that it is discriminatory to discriminate
as to one lawyer practicing alone or one lawyer practicing in a firm
or practicing together and sharing office expenses.
The case of Roe v. Salt Lake Cityf 20 U. 2d 266f 437 P. 2d 195,
holds that the tax must be uniform.
In the Roe Case, the plaintiff relied and the Court held that
the Ordinance was unconstitutional and plaintiff in the Roe Case

i
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relied upon the case of Davis v. Ogden Cityf 117 U. 315, 215 P. 2d
616.

Decided February 25, 1950.
On page 620 of the Pacific, at the bottom of the first column,

it states:
"Moreover, in 1931, this court in the case of
Morgan v. Salt Lake City et al„, 78 Utah 403,
3 P. 2d 510, dealt with certain sections of the
compiled Laws of Utah 1917, which were the
earlier enactments of, and in most respects
similar to, the two sections of the 1943 code
previously quoted. In that casef we held that
Salt Lake City did not have power to impose a
license or tax upon the operator of a card room
because the section of the statutes then in
force and effect did not enumerate a card
room as one of the businesses which could be licensed taxed or
regulated fry the city."
and on page 621, second column, third paragraph, it states:
"that the tax was arbitrary and discriminatory.
The court found that the primary purpose of that
ordinance was to raise revenue. However, the
Board of County Commissioners had singled out
the sheep business and had imposed a license
solely upon the business of raising, herding and
pasturing sheep.
The court refused to uphold the tax on the ground
that it was unequal and oppressive and said, 21
Utah at page 227, 61 P. at page 308.- "* * *
Private rights cannot thus be arbitrarily invaded
or annihilated under the mere guise of a license.
One class of citizens cannot thus be compelled
to bear the burdens of government, to the advantage
of all other classes. The law, as we have seen,
will not permit it. Neither the constitution
nor the statute authorized boards of county
commissioners to enact ordinances, as in this
instance, to tax citizens arbitrarily and unjustly,
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by license which confers no privilege that was
not previously enjoyed, and which has no view
to regulation. Unjust and illegal discrimination between persons, in taxation, and the denial
of equal justice, are within the prohibitions of
the constitution of this state, and of the United
States. No person can be deprived of his property
without due process of law."
On page 623, second column, second paragrpah:
"[10] In the case of Slater v. Salt Lake City,
Utah 206 P. 2d 153, we reviewed some of the
authorities dealing with unconstitutional
ordinances and discussed the elements necessary
to render an ordinance invalid because of
discrimination. We quote from that decision
at page 160 of 206 P. 2d: 'This court has
passed on the constitutionality of Statutes
and ordinances and has tested them by the rule
of unjust discrimination. In State v. Mason,
94 Utah 501, 78 P. 2d 920, 117 A. L. R. 330;
Broadbent et al v. Gibson, 105 Utah 53, 140
P. 2d 939; and Walberg et al, v. Utah Public
Welfare Commission et al., Utah 203 P. 2d 935,
we discussed the elements necessary to render a
statute or ordinance unconstitutional because
of discrimination. Discrimination is the essence
of classification and does violence to the
constitution only whenthe basis upon which it is
founded is unreasonable. * * * Our function is to
determine whether an enactment operates equally
upon all persons similarly situated. If it does
when the discrimination is within permissible
legislative limits. If it does not, then the
differentiation would be without reasonable basis
and the act does not meet the test of constitutionality."
In this case, there is discrimination between lawyers just
because they happen to be practicing alone. If they are practicing
alone, but sharing expenses with another lawyer, they pay less taxes.
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If they are practicing in a firm they pay one tax, and $3.00 for
each additional member and we contend that is discrimatory.
POINT II
STATUTE DOES NOT GIVE THE CITY AUTHORITY TO TAX
PROFESSIONS AND PEOPLE RENDERING PERSONAL SERVICES
BUT ONLY TO TAX BUSINESSES
That the statute does not allow the City to license professions
and other people rendering personal services, but that the City
under the guise of doing business and under their Ordinances has
been taxing professions, see Exhibit "A". They are taxing doctors
and other professional people and people rendering personal services
under the guise that they are doing business and the statute
does not cover any of them.
In the case of Davis v. Ogden City, in Judge Pratt's opinion,
on page 625, first column at bottom of page he states:
"It is true that the clause last above quoted,
throws the field wide open for the application
of Section 15-8-80, U.C.A. 1943, to all
kinds of business; but there is no reason nor
logic for concluding that as the result of the
opening of that field that "professions" have
suddenly become kinds of "business" and thus
included in the terms of Section 15-8-80.
The distinction between a profession and a
business is still recognized.
We have repeatedly recognized the practice of law
as a profession. We've recognized it in our
case by using such terms as "legal profession"
or "professional capacity." Ruckenbrod v.
Mullins, 102 Utah 548, 133 P.2d 324, 114 A.L.R.
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839; In re Jones 68 Utah 213, 249 P. 803. We
recognize it in our rules governing "Professional
Conduct." Section 6-0-14 U.C.A. 1943, refers to
"professional" misconduct. There are but a very
few specific instances pertaining to lawyers.
Section 79-9-18 U.C.A. 1943, defines "unprofessional conduct" as it applies to the medical profession.
Section 79-6-8 U.C.A. 1943, defines the "unprofessional conduct" in the practice of dentistry.
It seem rather superfluous to mention these facts
but I wish to emphasize the point that "profession" and"professions" are not just passing words
to be discarded as merely decorative of a means
of livelihood. It is interesting to note that
the Commission who enacted the Ogden City
ordinance in question were very particular to
define "engaging in business" as including
"the rendition of services by persons engaged
in any profession." (See Section 20b of the Ordinance) If "business" included "profession"
this was surplusage.
* * * Little or nothing has rbeen said about the
wording of this ordinance. I can't escape the
belief that, as the majority of this court
upholds it as a valid excercise of city
licensing powerf it will become the foundation
for similar enactments throughout the State.
If so, I think it is so broad and uncertain as to
how it will be applied to the professions, that
it cannot be justly enforced. The power of
final determination of the amount of the license
lies with the City Recorder (Sec. 18) who
presumably will be a layman unfamiliar with what
is meant by the practice of law, and upon whose
shoulders will lie the burden of deciding issues
under such provisions as : "only receipts from
that portion of business engaged in within the
corporate limits of "--blank city--"shall be
included in gross receipts as used herein."
(Sec. 20c). The practice of law is not defined
by the ordinance, nor are any rules provided
to aid the Recorder in allotting business
between offices if an attorney conducts an office
in each of two cities and his practice is State wide.
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Such broad unrestricted power as is contemplated
by the ordinance will lead to arbitrary action."
We want to call the court's attention that the statute only
authorised cities to tax business, but that the ordinance went further
in their definition and state, city ordinance 20-3-1 Sub. 2 "and the
rendering of personal services for others for a consideration by persons
engaged in any profession, trade, craft, business, occupation or other
calling." We submit that the City had no authority to enlarge the
statute by including professions and people rendering personal
services.
POINT III
UTAH STATE BAR ACT HAS PRE-EMPTED THE FIELD OF
REGULATING AND TAXING LAWYERS
The Utah State Bar Act 78-51 with subsections from 1 to 44
provided for the admissions of lawyers to practice law, their discipline and the disbarring of attorneys.

It provides in Section 78-51-21

for an annual license fee. That the Legislature by enacting these
sections has pre-empted the regulating and taxing of lawyers. In
the event that the City wants to tax lawyers in addition to businesses they should go to the Legislature and get an act passed which
authorises Cities to tax lawyers and professional people. The City
should not be allowed under the guise of taxing business, to tax
lawyers and other professional people.

If the City has the power to

license attorneys, it gives Cities the power to regulate attorneys.
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Salt Lake City concedes that it does not have the right to regulate
attorneys.

That is to be done by the Utah State Bar.

If they do not

have the right to regulate, they do not have the right to license.
If you are going to levy a tax, it must be levied upon an
individual or some legal entity.

It cannot be levied upon a place

of business. The individual must be taxed, not the business.
A business cannot practice law.

Even a professional corporation

cannot practice law, but it must be by its individual members. A place
of business is not an entity. A business cannot be a lawyer. A lawyer
must be an individual, a professional man.
The lawyers who are hired by the Union Pacific Railroad and have
an office can be used as an example. The city might tax the Union
Pacific Railroad as having a place of business, but the City cannot
tax those lawyers hired by the Union Pacific Railroad as lawyers
personally.

These lawyers should be taxed, which they are not, as prac-

ticing attorneys if the tax on all lawyers is going to be uniform.
There are professional corporations of attorneys, but a lawyer
must stand on his own feet as a professional man. Van Cott, Ryter
and Farnsworth is a professional corporation, but each member must be
judged by his own conduct.
If a member of the lawyers hired by the UnionPacific Railroad
was unethical, the Union Pacific Railroad would not be held liable,
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but the individual attorney would be the one who would have to
answer for the unethical conduct and the action would be brought
against him.

Mis-conduct of anyone in a professional firm would

be treated as a separate matter, not as a matter of the corporation
or the place of business and the right to practice law and what your
conduct is is regulated

by the Utah State Bar and the Union Pacific

Railroad is not controlled* by the Utah State Bar.
Each lawyer must be treated separately.

By incorporating a

professional corporation you do not get away from the personal liability
of each lawyer. Professional corporations primarily were made for
tax purposes and did not change the status of lawyers.
Lawyers must be

treated separately and by being in a partner-

ship or a professional corporation does not change their status.
Section 16-11-1 to 16-11-16 authorizes the forming of professional
corporations, but the act provides that lawyers are still personally
liable for their acts.

Section 16-11-3 provides:

"*
*
* while preserving the established professional aspects of the personal relationship between
the professional person and those he serves."
And Section 16-11-10 provides:
"Laws as to professional relationships not altered.-This act does not alter any law applicable to the
relationship between a person rendering professional
services and a person receiving such services,
including liability arising out of such professional
services."
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In the lower Court, the defendant relied upon California
cases.

They do not set out the California statute, but it appears

that the California statute gives special authority to tax and
regulate professions.

In California, they are not trying to tax

under the guise of business.
Business is done primarily for profit. Businesses are not held
up to the ethical conduct as lawyers and doctors. The Union Pacific
must show a profit for its stockholders. Law is a profession, not
a business. A Lawyer is held to a higher and stricter ethical and
moral code.
POINT IV
THE TAX HAS BEEN DISCRIMINATIVELY ADMINISTERED IN
VIOLATION OF THE STATE AND FEDERAL CONSTITUTION
If a tax is discriminatively administered, it is against the
equal protection law of both the Utah Constitution, Article I,
Section 2, and the 14th Amendment, Section 1 of the United States
Constitution.
Exhibit "A" and the Plaintiff's Third Amended Answer to
Defendant's Interrogatories, (R. 108-109) and the exhibit attached
thereto, (R. 110=120) and Defendant's Affidavit (R. 30-33) and
Defendant's Further Answers to Plaintiff's Interrogatories (R. 80-81)
and the exhibit attached thereto (R. 82-96) shows that the tax has been
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discriminitively administered.

That a substantial number of

lawyers have not paid any tax at all and some lawyers have paid
taxes of only $3.88 and other varying amounts and some lawyers have
paid a tax of $7.50 and other Lawyers have been required to pay a
tax of $30.00.
At 16 Am Jur 2d, Constitutional Law, Section 540, we quote
as follows:
"§ 540. Generally.
The purpose of the equal protection clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal
Constitution is to secure every person within the
state's jurisdiction against intentional and
arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned
by the express terms of the statute or by its
improper execution through duly constituted
agents. An actual discrimination arising from
the method of administering a law is as potent
in creating a denial of equality of rights^ as a
discrimination made by law.
The validity of a
state statute under the equal protection clause
therefore often depends on how it is construed and
*
applied.
Although as a general rule a law cannot be
held unconstitutional because, while its just interpretation is consistent with the constitution, it
is unfaithfully administered by those who are
charged with its execution it is nevertheless
an,equally well established principle that a provision not objectionable on its face may be
adjudged unconstitutional because of its effect in
operation.
A law, though fair on its face and
impartial in appearance, which is of such a nature
that it may be applied and administered with an
evil eye and unequal hand so as to make unjust and
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illegal discrimination is, when so applied and
administered, within the prohibition of the Federal
Constitution. ^ Hence, in a consideration of the
classification embodied in a statute, regard should
be given not only to its final purpose, but likewise
to the means provided for its administration. *"
One case involving taxes is the case of Concordia Fire Insurance
Company v.People of the State of Illinois, 292 U.S. 535, 78 L ed 1411,
54 S Ct 830, and at 292 U. S. 545, it states:
"Whether a state statute is valid or invalid under
the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment often depends on how the statute is construed
and applied. It maybe valid when given a particular
application and invalid when given another. Here
the application which was made of I 30 in respect
of the taxation of the net receipts of 1927, i. e.,
the application made by the assessing officers and
sustained by the Supreme Court brought the section
into conflict with the prohibition of that clause. This
means that as so applied it is invalid, notwithstanding
its validity in some different applications."
Also see head note No. 2 which states:
"2. The validity of a state statute under the equal
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment often
depends on how it it construed and applied."
The case of People v. Utica Daw's Drug Co., 16 App Div 2d 12,
225 NYS 2d 128, 4 ALR 3d 393 involves the Sunday Closing Law and at
4 ALR 3rd, page 398, it states:
"If the court finds that there was an intentional and
purposeful discrimination, the court should quash
the prosecution, not because the defendant is not
guilty of the crime charged, but because the court, as
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an agency of government, should not lend itself to a prosecution the maintenance of which would violate the
constitutional rights of the defendant."
And head note 4 on page 394 states as follows:
"4. If the court in a criminal prosecution against
the operator of a drugstore for the sale of certain
items in violation of the Sunday Statute, finds that
there was an intentional and purposeful discrimination
in the enforcement of the law, contrary to the equal
protection clauses of the state and federal constitutions
the court should quash the prosecution, not because
the defendant is not guilty of the crime charged, but
because the court, as an agency of the government,
should not lend itself to a prosecution the maintenance
of which would violate the constitutional rights of the
defendant."
CONCLUSION
We submit that the tax imposed by Salt Lake City is invalid.
That you cannot tax one lawyer $3.00 and another $30.00.

That the City

has tried by ordinances to include professional people which was not
covered by the statute. That the field of practicing law and taxing
of lawyers is pre-empted by the Bar Act. The City is not enforcing
the statute uniformly and therefore, it is unconstitutional.
If cities want to tax the professions, they should get an act
passed by the Legislature giving them such authority.
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We ask that the Court reverse the decision and enter Judgment
for the defendant on his Motion for Summary Judgment.
Respectfully Submitted,
GOLDEN W. ROBBINS
Attorney for Defendant and Appellant
455 East 400 South, Suite 50
Salt Lake City, Utah
WILLIAM H. HENDERSON
Attorney for Defendant and Appellant
455 South Third East #104
Salt Lake City, Utah

